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There is considerable evidence of behavioral differences in financial decision-making.
1
   In 
this paper we examine the extent to which trading behavior may depend on context; where 
the context is established by the type or category of asset.
2
 For example, an investor who 
exhibits risk-seeking behavior in his or her equity account may be very conservative in the 
management of a fixed income or cash account.  An investor who has a tendency towards 
the disposition effect for stocks purchased for speculative intent may not exhibit that 
behavior for stocks purchased for yield.   This question is relevant to the issue of whether 
behavioral tendencies are inherent or whether they may be primed; or even be a function of 
the classification of the asset itself. 
In this paper we use a sample of individual trading accounts in equity style funds 
taken from one fund family to test the hypothesis that trading styles are inherent vs. 
contextual.  Our sample contains investors who invest either in a growth fund, a value fund 
or both.   We document behavioral differences between growth fund investors and value 
fund investors. We find that their trades depend on past returns in different ways: growth 
fund investors tend towards momentum trading and value fund investors tend towards 
contrarian trading.  These differences may be due to inherent clientele characteristics.  For 
example, style funds may attract investors who have a specific philosophy about market 
prices, or specific personality traits and cognitive strategies that cause them to self-select 
into one or the other style.  We use a sample of investors that trade in both funds, to test 
this proposition.  Consistent with the contextual hypothesis, we find that investors trade 
their growth fund shares differently than their value fund shares. 
                                               
1 Cf. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), and Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008), Barber and Odean (2001) Deaves, 
Luders, and Luo (2009).Goetzmann and Massa (2002, 2003).  
2
  A general discussion of context-dependent financial decision making is contained in Slovic (1972), Shiller 
(1998), and Trimpop (1994). 
2 
 
Background 
Past research has examined how personal attributes such as risk aversion, age, 
religion and gender can explain differences in investor decision-making.
3
 There is also 
considerable evidence that decision-making under uncertainty changes according to 
context.  Classic studies by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) show that contextual framing 
of identical payoffs can alter the typical response. Experimental evidence suggests that 
priming can affect risk-taking behavior.
4
  Self-construal, or identification with a particular 
group appears to be a significant means by which behavioral shifts are induced. Bargh et 
al. (1996) established that priming identification with certain stereotypes affects behavior.  
Benjamin et al. (2010a, 2010b, and 2012) show that priming ethnic and religious identity 
influences economic choice.  Mandel (2003) and Hamilton and Biehal (2005) show that 
risk aversion is susceptible to priming subjects‘ self-construal in the independent vs. 
interdependent dimension.  In contrast to the abundant experimental evidence on inherent 
and contextual influences on economic decision-making, there is less evidence about cross-
sectional investor behavior drawn from actual market context.  In this paper we use a 
sample of individual investor mutual fund accounts to study factors influencing the 
heterogeneity of investor trading and to examine evidence regarding inherent vs. 
contextual factors. 
This study is related in general to research on attitudes toward risk. Many attempts 
have been made in the decisions-under-uncertainty literature to understand the underlying 
                                               
3 For example, in a well-known study, Barber and Odean (2001) find that men trade more than women. See 
also Deaves, Luders, and Luo (2009) for a discussion of gender, overconfidence, and trading. Many papers 
focus on the connection between investor-level attributes and investor trading, including Dorn and Huberman 
(2005), Christiansen et. al. (2008), and Feng and Seasholes (2005). In an experimental study, Dohmen, Falk, 
Huffman and Sunde (2010) find that risk aversion varies systematically with cognitive ability. 
4 Cf. Gilad and Kliger (2008). 
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factors in risk taking.
5
 Personality theories focus on characteristics or traits of the 
individual, such as age or gender or cognitive ability, are largely based on biological trait 
models.
6
 In terms of asset pricing theory, this view is consistent with the modeling of 
individuals by means of a utility function that captures relevant systematic differences in 
behavior (e.g. risk aversion). Situation-dependent theories have attempted to identify or 
clarify situational processes and moderating variables.  Mental accounting and loss 
aversion are examples of such theories.
7
  Whereas personality theories argue that 
individuals make decisions because of their own internal characteristics, the situation-
dependent theories argue that individuals make decisions based on the characteristics of the 
external situation. For example, investors may believe that the return generating process 
for each style is different and therefore a different approach to trading is required.  Despite 
theory which argues for a single pricing kernel, this view is more in alignment with 
behavioral theories in that agents categorizes assets into distinct groups based on some 
common characteristic and then treat each group as if they are fundamentally different. In 
sum, while personality theories and situation dependent theories are both valid and 
important sub-factors in the concept of risk, the evidence linking the two has been elusive. 
 
Our Approach 
In order to derive testable hypotheses about inherent vs. contextual behavior, we 
propose a mechanism based on priming of identity.  We assume that investors who own 
and trade shares in a particular fund identify with the investment philosophy governing the 
                                               
5 See an excellent review in Trimpop (1994). 
6 The first of the modern personality theories was developed by Pavlov (1927/1960). In canonical asset 
pricing theories investors are characterized by agent-specific attributes (such as risk preferences) and 
investors treat all assets in the investment opportunity set similarly (see, for example, Bossaerts and Plott 
(2004) and Feldman (2002)).  
7
 See Thaler (1980, 1985), Thaler and Johnson (1990), Barberis and Huang (2001), and Haigh and List 
(2005) and references therein. 
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management of that fund.  For example, an investor in a value fund identifies himself or 
herself as a value investor: one who believes in an intrinsic economic value to an asset 
around which the market price fluctuates due to market imperfections.  By the same token, 
a growth fund investor is assumed to identify with the growth investment philosophy: 
identification of stocks with high potential for future growth based on earnings and past 
trends.  Under this assumption, an investor in a value fund would exhibit contrarian 
investment behavior: selling shares after prices rose above some fundamental value and 
buying when they dropped below.  On the other hand, an investor in a growth fund would 
behave like a momentum investor, buying shares exhibiting positive appreciation and 
selling them after a significant drop.  Presumably, investors self-select into these style 
funds based on personal beliefs or traits. 
The contextual mechanism we propose relies on the potential for one or the other 
investment style to be made salient in an investor who holds both types of funds.  Chiao et 
al. (2006) and Benjamin et al. (2007; 2010b) demonstrate success in priming different 
group associations in mixed-race subjects.  This suggests that a single subject can maintain 
a latent identification with multiple groups, and that priming can make one of multiple 
identities salient for decision-making.  In other words, an investor holding shares in both 
growth and value funds may identify with the philosophy and subscribe to the implied 
trading behavior of both styles at once, even though, in certain contexts, this would imply 
opposite responses to past price trends.  In fact, growth and value investing need not be 
incompatible; they may be appropriate investment styles for different categories of stocks, 
for example. 
We propose that investors think of their growth and value funds as separate 
strategies and employ different trading rules depending on which of the two they trade. 
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This may be facilitated by a subliminal priming or framing, or it may be conscious and 
based on a belief about the efficacy of employing different strategies for different 
categories of investment.  Although we document evidence of contextual decision-making, 
we do not distinguish between conscious vs. unconscious determinants of behavior, as we 
cannot control or observe the precise context in which the decisions are made. 
This paper obtains three main results.  First, we analyze trading decisions at an 
individual level with respect to investments of different, clearly defined, characteristics – 
growth and value investments.  Using individual trade data, we demonstrate that investors 
who specialize in different classes of assets (growth or value funds) tend to follow different 
trading rules. Value investors tend to be contrarian buyers (buying after price declines), 
while growth investors tend to be momentum buyers (buying after price increases). 
 Second, we consider many different trading signals in order to allow for differences 
in horizon across individuals.  We find that individuals who specialize in growth securities 
tend to use short-term return signals while value investors tend to use longer-term signals. 
Different investors exhibit differences not only in how they respond to a return signal 
(momentum or contrarian), but they are also different in the type of signal to which they 
respond.  
 Third, having established that growth-only and value-only investors display 
differences in their propensities to trade, we study individual investors who trade both 
value and growth securities. We find that multi-style investors appear to adopt different 
trading strategies depending on the characteristics of the asset being traded.  Our findings 
are consistent with the hypothesis that the trading style of an individual is not necessarily 
an inter-temporally consistent characteristic independent of context, but instead may be 
influenced by the characteristics of the investment.  
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We use value and growth styles in this study because the popular press and recent 
academic literature make a clear distinction between value and growth investments. The 
two styles naturally lead to different investment contexts (Benz (2007) p. 93). Regarding 
value investing, ―value investors often look for quiet, out-of-favor, ‗boring‘ companies that 
have excellent financial performance. Investing in such stocks assumes that the stock price 
will eventually rise to match the intrinsic value.‖ (Warren (2010) p. 652) The concept 
behind value investing challenges the efficient markets hypothesis in that the investors 
look for undervalued assets in order to gain a long-term (eventual) return. Value investors 
buy when prices are low. This idea is echoed by Seth Klarman (1991), ―Value investing by 
its very nature is contrarian.‖ (p. 165)8   
Growth securities and investors are painted differently. Whereas value investors 
look for cheap securities, the growth investor wants to buy the ―Ferraris of the stock 
market‖ hoping to ―ride the wave‖ to higher returns. (Warren (2010) p. 652) Growth 
investors are willing to buy at any price with the belief that earnings growth will lead to 
significant price appreciation. Contrary to the efficient markets hypothesis, growth 
investors believe that growth opportunities are not correctly incorporated into prices 
leading to the search for stocks that will provide quick momentum related returns.  
This is not the first paper to study trading patterns of investors.  Stock trading by 
individual investors has been studied by several authors: Odean (1998, 1999), Barber and 
Odean (2000, 2001, 2002), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Lee and Kumar (2006), and 
Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008). It has been documented that investors use past returns to 
make trading decisions. Using daily mutual fund trades Goetzmann and Massa (2002) find 
                                               
8 Christine Benz has worked as an analyst and editor for Morningstar since 1993. Carl Warren is a professor 
emeritus at the University of Georgia. Seth Klarman is a hedge fund manager for Baupost Group. His out-of-
print book currently sells for over $2,000 on Amazon.com. 
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that some investors in an S&P 500 index fund follow a momentum strategy while others 
follow a contrarian trading strategy. Odean (1998) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find 
evidence of the disposition effect
9
 – investors hold on to their poor performing stocks but 
sell stocks exhibiting past high returns.  Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008) report that past 
returns influence investors' buying and selling decisions for stocks. Lee and Kumar (2006) 
argue that the trading behavior of retail investors focused in particular segments or styles 
contribute to observed pricing anomalies.  The unique feature of our study is the 
comparative analysis of how individual investors trade across styles and how trading 
decisions are affected by the types of securities being traded.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes our data. The description of 
methodology and results describing the trading behavior of style investors are provided in 
Section II. The analysis of multi-style trading behavior is listed in section III.  Concluding 
remarks follow in Section IV. 
 
I. Data 
This study employs a unique data set containing anonymous individual account 
activity provided by a large mutual fund complex.
10
 The daily data include all trades made 
by clients, identified by a unique account number, for two mutual fund styles within the 
complex from 1997-1999
11
.  The data consists of daily activity records for all accounts that 
existed or were formed in the three-year sample period. All individual identifying 
characteristics of these accounts were removed by the data provider. From the different 
                                               
9 See Shefrin and Statman (1985) 
10 No identifying characteristics of the account were given to researchers, keeping accounts anonymous. 
11
 Most of the mutual funds sell various classes of shares (i.e. Class A, Class B, etc.).  We include all share 
classes in the study.  
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mutual funds available to us, we identify six mutual funds that describe themselves as 
being growth oriented and five funds that describe themselves as being value oriented.
12
   
The data identifies the account as being held by an individual, a broker, a trust, a 
corporation, or retirement account (both 401k and IRA).  Since we are interested in the 
timing decisions of investors, we remove all trades associated with retirement investing.  
Retirement funds are often invested according to a predetermined schedule (bi-weekly or 
monthly) and therefore do not reflect the timing decisions of the investor.  All other 
investor types are included. 
Table I provides statistics regarding our sample of growth and value funds.  We 
categorize the data into four groups: the value trades made by value investors, the growth 
trades of growth investors, the value trades of multi-style investors (who hold both value 
and growth funds), and the growth trades of multi-style investors.  We identify 87,458 
different accounts that fit the description of one of the three investor types.  This is 
comparable to the number of accounts used in other studies.
13
   
We first notice the popularity of growth investing during our sample period.  There 
are more growth investors than both value investors and multi-style investors.  Growth 
investors trade more often in our sample trading an average of 4.4 times.  Value investors, 
on the other hand, trade on average only 3.07.  Investors trading both growth and value 
also exhibit interesting trading behavior.  These investors trade growth over three times as 
                                               
12 It is important to point out that our study is based on data on trading mutual funds and not individual 
stocks. This provides several important advantages. First, we (as researchers) do not need to categorize assets 
into value and growth categories, and therefore do not suffer from our criteria being ad hoc or different from 
the criteria employed by the market participants. Value and growth mutual funds are categorized, named, and 
marketed as such by the mutual fund family that provided the data. Second, investors in our data set who 
trade both value and growth funds trade exactly the same assets as value-only and growth-only investors. For 
example, their information sets contain the same past performance information. 
13 For comparison, Barber and Odean (2000) study 66,465 investors, Graham and Kumar (2006) use 60,000, 
Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2009) use 32,259 mutual fund investors, Odean (1998, 1999) chooses 10,000 
individual accounts, and Barber and Odean (2002) analyze 1,607 investors who switched from phone-based 
to online trading during the 1990s. 
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much as they trade value (9.83 growth trades per investor versus 3.11 value trades per 
investor).  However, trading is highly skewed with many account holders trading only once 
during our sample period.
14
 
The time between trades is homogeneous across value investors, growth investors 
and multi-style investors. We calculate the average time between trades for each investor 
in each investor type. The median frequency in trading is the same across the three investor 
types – roughly 30 days between trades.  It is common to have trades automated to occur at 
a pre-set frequency time (monthly, bi-weekly, etc).  This type of trading adds noise to our 
analysis since such type of trading is not based on market timing.  Interestingly, though we 
find many occurrences of multi-style investors trading both value and growth on the same 
day, we find a median time of 5.6 (average of 32 days) days between consecutive value 
and growth trades by the same individual.   
Overall, evidence suggests differences in the way growth funds and value funds are 
traded. Growth funds, whether traded by growth investors or multi-style investors, are 
more frequently traded than value funds. We investigate the differences in trading behavior 
more rigorously in the next sections.   
 
II. Growth Traders versus Value Traders 
A. Identification of Momentum and Contrarian Investors 
We use individual account activity to classify investors according to their pattern of 
share purchases and redemptions. For each growth investor and value investor, we classify 
each trade as being a momentum purchase, contrarian purchase, momentum sell or 
contrarian sell.  This classification is conditional on a predetermined past return signal.  All 
                                               
14
 Individual mutual fund investors studied by Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2009) make average (median) 
purchases of 8.5 (3.0) in their taxable accounts over the six year period 1991-1996.   
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purchases that occur on the day after observing a positive (negative) return signal are 
considered momentum buys (contrarian buys).  Likewise, all redemptions that occur on the 
day after observing a negative (positive) return signal are considered momentum sells 
(contrarian sells). Positive feedback traders (momentum investors) react by purchasing 
when prices rise and selling when prices fall. Negative feedback traders (contrarian 
investors) are characterized in exactly the opposite fashion, buying after a drop in price and 
sell after a rise.  
An individual investor is then classified as a momentum buyer, contrarian buyer, 
momentum seller, contrarian seller, or undetermined depending on the number of trades 
the individual agent made that were consistent with the strategy.  We classify the investor 
as a momentum buyer if the number of purchases occurring on days following a positive 
return signal is significantly greater than that expected assuming a random distribution of 
trades.  The same method is used to determine contrarian buyers, momentum sellers and 
contrarian sellers.  Those that do not fit into one of the trading strategies are classified as 
undefined.   Following Goetzmann and Massa (2002), we use a binomial distribution to 
determine whether the number of trades following a particular strategy is greater than 
expected if the investor traded randomly.  This statistic is equivalent to a ―backwards-
looking‖ Henriksson and Merton (1982) timing test, and thus its properties are thus well-
understood. The probability is determined using    

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where n is the total number of buys (or sells), x is the number of buys (sells) consistent 
with a particular strategy, and p is the probability of observing a particular return signal.  
To determine the probability p, we use returns over the five-year period prior to our sample 
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period plus the three years of our sample period - the eight-year period 1992-1999.  The 
probability of a positive return signal is equal to the ratio of observed positive returns over 
total number of days.  We will discuss the sensitivity of our results to this choice later. 
To classify an investor, the individual must not only trade consistently, but more 
fundamentally, he must trade.  As seen in Table 1, the median number of trades is one for 
both growth investors and value investors.  Such investors are unclassifiable.  To eliminate 
some noise in our analysis we consider only those investors who trade (either buy or sell) 
at least four times in our sample.  We are left with 834 value investors and 12,884 growth 
investors. 
There are many instances of individual agents making multiple growth or value 
trades within the same day thus multiplying the reaction to a single signal.  This can have 
the affect of falsely associating the agent to a particular trading strategy.  To eliminate this 
possibility, we aggregate all trades (both buys and sells) made by the same investor within 
the same style on the same day to a single trade.   
We classify investors using seven different past return signals. This is one of the 
important contributions of this paper. While past studies focus on the previous day‘s return 
as the signal to classify momentum and contrarian trading behavior, it is important to 
investigate other return histories. It is a priori unclear how far back investors look to 
determine their trading strategies.  Many trading strategies (moving average strategies, for 
example) use days or months of past return data as a signal to trade.  Further, past research 
has shown that returns exhibit positive serial correlation over short horizons and negative 
serial correlation over longer horizons (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)).  We, therefore, 
calculate past return signals using (Pt-1 – Pt-1-j)/ Pt-1-j for j = 1, 5, 10, 20, 40, 60, and 90 
days.  We choose the intervals to correspond to one day, a calendar week (5 trading days), 
12 
 
a calendar month (20 trading days), and a quarter, among others. We use the notation j-day 
to distinguish the various past return windows.  Using these return signals, which range 
from the previous day‘s return to the previous year‘s return, we let the data tell us which 
signals are important.
15
  
B. Classification Results 
The results of the classification are provided in Tables II and III.  Table II Panels A 
and B show the classification of value buyers and growth buyers.  We use five categories: 
strong momentum, weak momentum, undefined, weak contrarian and strong contrarian.  
Strong and weak investors are defined by statistical significance where strong momentum 
and strong contrarian investors have p-values less than 10%, and weak momentum and 
weak contrarian investors have p-values between 10% and 50%.  An investor is considered 
undefined if the p-value is greater than 50% for both the momentum and contrarian 
strategies.  Such investors either did not trade in a consistent way or did not trade a 
sufficient number of times.  
We first observe that both momentum and contrarian investing strategies are used 
by groups of value and growth investors. From the 1-day return signal, 1.94% of value 
investors and 5.35% of growth investors are classified as strong momentum buyers while 
5.67% of value investors and 4.59% of growth investors are classified as strong contrarian 
buyers.   For this signal, we are unable to classify 52% of the value investors and 58.5% of 
the growth investors.  These results are comparable to the findings of Goetzmann and 
Massa (2002) who study investors in an S&P 500 index fund.  They find that 1.08% of all 
                                               
15 Studying trades in and out of mutual funds is particularly interesting because there is no immediate 
opposing trade.  When an investor buys a stock, another must sell.  If we use the previous day‘s return as a 
trading signal, then every momentum trade must be matched with a contrarian trade.  Mutual funds are 
different.  An investor may move in and out of the mutual fund without the need of an immediate opposing 
trade. 
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buyers are strong momentum traders, 2.36% are strong contrarian investors, 68% are 
unclassified. The method performs well in our setting. For all return signals we are able to 
classify at least as well. 
Over all return signals, value investors tend to be more contrarian in their purchases 
while growth investors tend to be more momentum oriented in their purchases.  This can 
be seen in Panel C of Table II where we report the results of the Mantel-Haenzel test.  We 
compute the average investor type for both growth and value investors.  All contrarian 
investors (both strong and weak) receive a score of -1, momentum investors (both strong 
and weak) a score of +1, and unclassified investors a score of 0.  The average of the scores 
over all investors in each style is a number between -1 and +1. Positive values indicate that 
on average the investors follow a momentum buying strategy while negative values 
indicate that on average the investors follow a contrarian buying strategy.  Using the 
Mantel-Haenszel chi-square statistic, we test whether the average growth investor type is 
the same as the average value investor type.  Results indicate a clear difference in trading 
strategy that is dependent on the style of the security being purchased.  These results are 
robust to the choice of scoring system.    
The average growth investor follows a momentum strategy for all return signals, 
though at shorter horizons (up to 10 trading days) contrarian behavior has a strong 
presence among growth investors. Figure 1 plots the average investing style of the growth 
investor at each signal horizon.  Positive values indicate momentum tendencies on average 
while negative values indicate average contrarian tendencies. As the trading signal 
increases in length, more investors are classified as following a momentum strategy.  For 
the 1-day signal, 5.35% are considered strong momentum but at the 90-day signal, 16.01% 
can be classified as being strong momentum investors. We do observe a large percentage 
14 
 
of contrarian investing at the short-term signals.  At the 1-day signal, 5.35% are classified 
as strong momentum while 4.59% are strong contrarian.  We actually find a larger number 
of strong contrarian investors at the 5-day signal. 
Value investors are different.  As Figure 1 and Table II both show, value buyers are 
contrarian investors for all return signals. Whereas the average investing strategy is near 
zero for some signals with the growth investors, the average value investor is clearly 
contrarian. Momentum investing is present, but is less than two-percent for five of the 
seven signals. As with the growth investors, we classify more value investors as 
contrarians with the longer horizon signals. This suggests that the strategies followed by 
investors are more rely more on longer term signals than very short signals.  We will test 
this more directly in the next section.  
The differences between value and growth investors are also evident from Figure 3. 
The figure shows the distribution of trading strategies for the seven return signals. Two 
patterns emerge from the figure when the distribution for value investors (top left graph) is 
compared with the distribution for growth investors (top right). First, compared with 
growth investors, value investors exhibit a stronger tendency for contrarian purchases at 
any past signal horizon. For a given return signal, there are more contrarian buyers among 
value investors, and there are more momentum buyers among growth investors. Second, 
the figures illustrate the importance of the signal horizon. The distribution of contrarian 
and momentum traders changes with the signal horizon. Some investors are unable to be 
classified using some signals but can be classified using other signals. 
Not only are growth and value traders different in their buying behavior, they are 
also different in their selling behavior. Table III shows the classification of value and 
growth sell strategies.  There are growth and value sellers who follow a contrarian strategy 
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(sell when past returns are positive) and there are investors who follow a momentum 
strategy (sell when past returns are negative).  Using the 1-day return signal, 7.69% of 
value investors and 1.82% of growth investors are classified as strong momentum sellers 
and 2.56% of value traders and 3.25% of growth investors are classified as strong 
contrarian sellers.  We are unable to classify 51% of the value investors and 58% of the 
growth investors.  Goetzmann and Massa (2002) find 0.11% of investors are momentum 
sellers, 0.27% are contrarian sellers, and 87% are unclassified for investors in S&P 500 
index fund.  
Table III – Panel C and Figure 2 provide the average growth and value investor 
types.  Similar to the buy scoring system, all momentum sellers are given a score of +1, all 
undefined investors receive a score of 0, and all contrarian sellers are given a score of -1.  
A positive value implies that on average the investors are momentum traders, while a 
negative average implies that on average investors are contrarian.  The average growth 
seller is positive but near zero, equal numbers of contrarian and momentum traders, for the 
1-day, 5-day, and 10-day signals. The average, however, becomes negative for the longer 
horizon signals indicating that growth investors are contrarian sellers.  The highest average 
(in absolute value) is found using the 90-day return signal.  More than 8% of growth sellers 
are classified as strong contrarian using this signal compared to only 0.42% classified as 
strong momentum.  Growth investors tend to sell when markets rise.  This is consistent 
with the disposition effect that describes the investor behavior of holding losers and selling 
winners.
16
  This is true for all of the longer return signals.   
Again, we find that value investors behave differently.  Value investors are 
momentum sellers for all signals.  The Mantel-Haenszel chi-square statistics show that the 
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 See Odean (1998), Locke and Mann (2005), Frazzini (2006), Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2006), and 
Goetzmann and Massa (2008) and references therein for discussions regarding the disposition effect. 
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average growth investor and the average value investor are significantly different for all 
signal horizons.  More so than growth sellers, value investors sell when they observe 
falling returns.   
Figure 4 illustrates the difference between the value investors (upper left graph) and 
growth investors (upper right). The figure shows the distribution of different investor types 
for various past return signals. The figure also shows the importance of the length of the 
return signal. 
The tests above are based on classifying individuals according to their trading 
strategy. Our results indicate important differences between value and growth investors in 
regard to trading strategies. We find existence of both momentum and contrarian investing 
by both growth and value investors. Overall, growth investors tend to follow a momentum 
buy and contrarian sell strategy.  The single return signal that classifies the most growth 
investors (as either strong momentum or strong contrarian) is the 90-day signal for 
purchases and the 5-day signal for redemptions. Value investors tend to follow a contrarian 
buy and momentum sell strategy.  The return signal that classifies the most value investors 
is the 90-day return signal for both purchases and redemptions. 
 
C. Classification Results: Return Signal  
 In the previous analysis we discussed several possible signal horizons and studied 
the differences between value and growth traders for each horizon. We found that some 
agents were able to be classified using short-term signals while other agents could only be 
classified using the long-term signals indicating that agents have different horizons.  We 
now advance our analysis by classifying each agent by the signal most likely being used to 
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make investment decisions. This is an important issue not yet explored in the literature.  
Different investors exhibit differences not only in how they respond to a return signal 
(momentum or contrarian), but they are also different in the type of signal to which they 
respond. In this section we double sort all agents first by trading strategy and then by 
trading signal.  This is the first study to classify individual investors according to signal 
horizon.     
To study the potential differences between value and growth investors with respect 
to signal length, we proceed as follows. For each investor in the dataset we determine the 
signal length (1-day, 5-day, etc.) that results in the highest p-value in the binomial 
classification method. The investors are still classified as momentum or contrarian (or 
unclassified), but now for each investor we determine the signal length with the greatest 
statistical support.  
 Results are provided in Table IV for investor buying behavior.  This table lists the 
percent of all value investors (Panel A) and all growth investors (Panel B) according to the 
trading strategy and trading signal that best describes their past trading behavior.  Whereas 
in Tables II and III, each investor is evaluated using each trading signal so that the column 
sum always equals 100%,  in Table IV, each investor appears only once – at the best 
trading strategy and best trading signal.  
 Consistent with our previous results, momentum buying dominates contrarian 
buying for growth investors while for value investors the contrarian buying strategy 
dominates the momentum strategy. In the aggregate, 55.15% of growth investors follow 
the momentum strategy (23.54% are classified as strong momentum). Though fewer than 
the momentum investors, we do find a large number of contrarian investors - 35.33% of 
growth investors are contrarian investors (12.43% are strong contrarian). Value investors 
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exhibit a strong tendency toward contrarian buying: 64.26% of value investors are 
classified as contrarian in their purchases (44.84% as strong contrarian). Only 14.27% of 
value investors are momentum investors in their purchases (17.51% are strong 
momentum). Sorting investors by strategy and signal allows us to classify 78.54% of the 
value investors and over 90% of the growth investors.  Investors use a variety of signals 
and strategies when making their investment decisions. 
 We find interesting differences in signal horizon between growth and value 
investors.  Comparing the percent of growth and value investors at each signal, we find 
that the greatest percentage of growth investors use signals the 1-day while the greatest 
percentage of value investors use 90-day signal.  We classify 19.27% of all growth 
investors using the 1-day return signal and 33.33% of value investors using the 90-day 
signal. 
 Another way to compare signal horizons across the two groups of style investors is 
to compare short-term signals to long-term signals.  Let the short-term signals be the 1-day 
through 10-day signals and long-term signal as the 40-day through 90-day signals.  We 
find that 44.97% of all growth investors and 27.09% of all value investors rely on short-
term signals.  On the other hand, 34.94% of growth investors and 45.32% of value 
investors follow the long-term signal.  Growth investors tend to respond to short-term 
information as compared to value investors who rely on longer-term signals. 
 Consider the selling behavior as described in Table V. Overall, we are able to 
categorize fewer investors according to their redemptions as compared to their purchases.  
Investors in our sample bought more than sold.  For growth investors, contrarian selling is 
more strongly present than momentum selling. In the aggregate, 8.11% of growth investors 
are strong contrarian and 3.99% are strong momentum sellers (though the percentages are 
19 
 
nearly equal when the weak classification is included). Value investors exhibit tendencies 
toward momentum selling: 27.22% of value investors are classified as strong momentum 
in their sales while only 3% of value investors are strong contrarian sellers.  This is 
consistent with our previous results. 
 Similarly to the differences in buying behavior, growth and value investors also use 
different signal horizons to determine when to sell. Over all trading signals, the largest 
percentage of growth investors (11.59%) are best described as using the 1-day trading 
signal. In contrast, the largest percentage of value investors (27.82%) appear to use the 90-
day signal. This suggests that value investors rely on longer-term signals than growth 
investors in their selling behavior, just as they do in their purchases. 
 The tendency for growth investors to rely on shorter-term signals and value 
investors to rely on long-term signals is even more evident when aggregating over all 
short-term signals (1-day through 10-day) and all long-term signals (40-day through 90-
day). We are able to classify 49.99% of all growth investors as momentum or contrarian 
(weak and strong), and 26.54% of all growth investors are best described as using the 
short-term signals. Only 17.36% of all growth investors appear to use the long term 
signals. Value investors rely on longer-term signals. We classify 55.04% of all value 
investors with 16.56% using the short-term signals and 34.3% following the long term 
signals. 
 Overall, not only do growth and value investors exhibit differences in the way they 
respond to return signals (momentum vs. contrarian behavior), but they also differ in the 
type of signal that growth and value to which they respond. Growth investors follow to 
short-term signals more so than to longer-term signals, and value investors display the 
opposite tendency. 
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D. Classification Results: Robustness  
 Value investors trade differently than growth investors. One important concern that 
needs to be addressed is the possibility that this result is caused by an unusual episode in 
capital markets. The time period of our data, 1997 to 1999, overlaps with the beginning of 
the technology bubble where technology stocks, a subset of growth stocks, increased in 
price at a dramatic rate relative to non-technology stocks. Though it is difficult to identify 
the actual beginning of the bubble, it appears clear that the bubble period contains 1999 
and at least part of 1998. In this section, we discuss the results of additional tests 
conducted to reduce concerns that our previously discussed results are a product of this 
unusual period. 
The empirical method used takes into account the sudden rise in prices. The 
binomial distribution requires the probability p of observing a positive return signal. A 
large probability increases the difficulty of classifying an investor as a momentum trader 
by requiring more trades that are consistent with the strategy. Over the bubble period, 
prices increased rapidly causing the likelihood of observing negative return signal to drop. 
It may be the case that the probabilities p estimated from 1992 to 1999 returns are too 
small making it too easy to classify investors as momentum traders.   
This problem does not affect the value investor classification results. If the bubble 
period increased the occurrences of positive return signals for value stocks, then finding 
trades consistent with a contrarian strategy would be more difficult. We conduct a simple 
test to determine how different the bubble period was for value stocks as compared to a 
larger time period.  We estimate the probability of observing a positive return using the 
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eight year period of 1992 to 1999 (unconditional probability) and compare it to the 
probability estimated using our sample period of 1997 to 1999 (conditional probability).  
We use the S&P 500 BARRA Value Index (SVX) as a proxy for value securities.  If there 
is a significant increase in the price of value assets then the probability of observing a 
positive return should be much larger using the conditional data versus the unconditional.  
For all signal lengths, 1-day through 90-day, the difference in probabilities is less than 4% 
with the largest difference (3.7%) occurring with the 20 day signal – the difference is less 
than 2% for all other signals.  For example, for the 1-day signal the unconditional 
(conditional) probability is 53.8% (52.3%), and is 72.5% (74.4%) for the 90-day signal.  
The conditional probability is larger than the unconditional only for the 90-day signal.  
This evidence suggests that the bubble period, in regard to our return signals, is not 
significantly different than the eight year period. 
The problem with selecting the probability may be more of an issue for the growth 
securities.  We conduct the same analysis using the S&P 500 BARRA Growth Index as our 
proxy for growth stocks. The unconditional probabilities relative to the conditional 
probabilities differ by less than 5% for the 1-day, 5-day, 10-day, 20-day and 40-day return 
signals.  For the 1-day return signal, the unconditional probability is 53.5% compared to 
the conditional probability of 54.4%.  As the signal length increases, the differences in 
probabilities become larger.
17
   
To check the sensitivity of the 60-day and 90-day results to the choice of 
probability, we re-classify investors using a larger probability.  For the 60-day return 
signal, the unconditional probability is 75.3%.  Increasing to 80% we find the new 
classification of 24.6% momentum investors (4.9% strong momentum) and 11.7% 
                                               
17 The difference in the probabilities for the 60-day signal is 8.7%, and is 12.2% for the 90-day signal. 
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contrarian investors (2.1% weak contrarian).  Growth investors still lean strongly toward 
momentum investing.  We must raise the probability to nearly 84% for the percentage of 
contrarians to overtake the number of momentum investors.  Similarly for the 90-day 
return signal, we must increase the probability to nearly 89% for us to classify more 
growth investors as contrarian than momentum.  At these near certain probabilities for 
observing positive return signals, it would be amazing that value investing would have 
even existed during this time.
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As a more straight forward test for robustness, we cut the time period in half and 
classify investors in the time period 1997 through June, 1998.  This eliminates much of the 
initial rise of the bubble.  We identify 4825 growth investors who made at least four trades 
during this 18 month period.  The results are consistent with the entire sample.  For the 1-
day and 5-day signals, the numbers of momentum and contrarian investors are similar with 
21.3% (17.0%) momentum (contrarian) for the 1-day signal and 20.8% (19.4%) for the 5-
day signal.  The number of momentum investors increases with the signal length with 
24.7% (11.9%) momentum (contrarian) investors at the 10-day signal, 30.5% (8.2%) at the 
20-day signal, and so on.  These results are consistent with our previously reported full 
sample results. 
Ideally, our dataset would not overlap with any unusual period in capital markets. 
With the number of market crashes, recessions, and bubbles observed over the past twenty 
years, each of which affected markets for several years, it is difficult to find a period that 
one can deem ―normal.‖ We must therefore deal with the data that we have. The above 
tests help alleviate some of the concerns related to the technology bubble. First, the bubble 
period does not affect the analysis of the value investors since the technology bubble 
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 Using 0.89 probability of observing a return signal, one would need to make 20 momentum trades out of 
20 total trades to be considered a strong momentum investor. 
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mostly affected growth assets. This rise in prices actually makes it more difficult to 
classify contrarian investors by making the occurrence of a negative return signal less 
frequent. Second, the empirical method accounts for the large increase in growth prices 
over the period. We find that the conditional and unconditional probabilities are nearly 
identical for the short term signal. This is the type of signal that the largest fraction of 
growth investors appears to follow. In order for our results to vanish with the longer term 
signals we must increase the likelihood of observing a positive return signal to a very large 
value. Finally, our results hold in the period preceding (or at the early stages) of the 
bubble.       
 
III. Multi-Style Investors – Consistency in Trading Strategies 
Having established systematic differences between growth investors and value 
investors, we make another step in the study of investor trading behavior.  In this section 
we consider investors who trade in both growth and value styles (multi-style investors). By 
comparing multi-style investors with value-only and growth-only groups we study whether 
a propensity to trade in a certain way resides with an investor, such as age, gender and risk 
aversion, or whether it is affected by situational factors, such as the type of asset being 
traded. 
Propensity to trade in a certain fashion – momentum or contrarian – may be a 
characteristic of an individual investor. In much the same way it is assumed that an 
individual has a particular aversion to risk, an investor may be naturally prone to trade 
different assets according to a consistent trading rule. An investor may behave as a 
contrarian investor and may show this characteristic when investing across different assets. 
An investor who trades consistently across all assets may follow either a momentum or a 
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contrarian strategy. This is a feature of the prior literature on investor trading behavior 
where an important latent assumption is maintained that it is highly unlikely for an investor 
to display different trading strategies across different types of investments. In such a 
setting, it is not likely for an individual to be a momentum investor for certain assets and a 
contrarian investor with a different set of assets.  
A number of authors, for example, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999) present behavioral 
models that are based on the idea that investors are prone to behavioral heuristics and have 
inherent biases in the way they interpret information (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)). For 
example, investors may apply "representative heuristic" which may lead them to 
mistakenly conclude that firms realizing extraordinary earnings growth will continue to 
experience similar extraordinary growth in the future (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998)).
19
 This approach to forming beliefs will affect all stocks in the investors' 
opportunity set.  
In our setting, the personality factor implies than an individual who trades both 
value and growth will exhibit the same propensity to trade in both value and growth 
holdings. A momentum investor will be expected to display momentum trading in both 
value and growth trades. A contrarian investor will use contrarian strategies in both styles. 
  There is an important alternative, however. In addition to an invariant, inherent 
personality-trait component, risk taking may be related to situational factors. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981, 1984) and Thaler (1985) show that different situations, referred to as 
"situational frames," can cause the dependence of preferences on the formulation of 
decision problems. When asset characteristics themselves play a role in how investors 
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 Representative heuristic is the tendency of individuals to identify an uncertain event, or a sample, by the 
degree to which it is similar to the parent population (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
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trade them, the same investor can exhibit different trading patterns depending on the 
characteristics of the assets.  
It has been argued that asset characteristics contribute to how investors make 
decisions. For example, investors frequently classify assets into categories (or, styles) and 
then express their demand for risky assets at the levels of these categories (Barberis and 
Shleifer (2003)). The approach that investors take to form expectations about the 
performance of different categories (styles) may depend on a chosen style. Characteristic 
of the asset—or perceived characteristics—can potentially alter the way in which investors 
think about that asset.  
A commonly used classification into value and growth assets can also result in 
dependence of trading strategies on the type of asset. As an example, if an asset is 
classified by an investor as a value asset, after a price drop (when the asset becomes 
―cheaper‖), it may be perceived that the asset‘s ―value‖ characteristic has been enhanced 
by the lower price. Alternatively, if an asset is considered to be a growth asset, after a price 
increase (and thus after an observed growth), the asset‘s ―growth‖ trait may be perceived 
as being stronger.  
Very little is known whether a given investor would tend to form expectations 
about different categories of assets in a consistent, similar fashion, or whether an investor 
would apply different models for forming expectations depending on the classification or 
characteristics of the assets. Understanding context dependent investment decision making 
is important. Different situational frames and expectations, as well as different 
personalities, may very well interact to produce the sometimes opposite behaviors shown 
by the same person in objectively similar situations. Using the sample of individual 
investors who trade both growth and value, we test to see whether the investors use the 
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same trading strategy across styles or whether they apply different strategies to different 
styles. 
A. Classification Analysis 
We classify all multi-style investors as momentum, undefined, or contrarian 
according to their value trades and then classify all investors according to their growth 
trades. Each investor falls into one of nine categories based on their value classificat ion 
and their growth classification (momentum, unclassified or contrarian for value trades 
times the same three categories for their growth trades). 
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of multi-style investor types for buys. Figure 4 
shows the distribution for sells.
20
 These figures allow us to clearly compare the distribution 
of trading behavior of the multi-style investors‘ value trades (lower left) with the 
distribution of behavior of the value-only investors‘ trades (upper left). We can also 
compare the multi-style investors‘ trades of growth funds (lower right) with the 
distribution of behavior of growth-only investors (upper right).  
 The figures illustrate two important findings.  First, multi-style investors trade 
differently across their value and growth holdings. Second, the figures show striking 
similarities between the way multi-style investors trade their value holdings and the way 
value-only investors trade; and between the way multi-style investors trade their growth 
holdings and the way growth-only investors trade.  Multi-style investors trade their growth 
holdings in a similar way as the growth-only investors, but trade like the value-only 
investors in their value trades. This is true for both purchases and redemptions.  
                                               
20 For Figures 3 and 4, we plot only those investors who trade at least four times total (sum of value and 
growth trades).  This allows for a more direct comparison with the plots for value and growth style investors 
also provided in Figures 3 and 4.   
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We proceed with a more formal analysis of these tendencies. For each investor we 
match his value trading strategy with his growth trading strategy. This is a difficult 
classification because it requires the same investor to trade a sufficient number of times in 
each style.  A majority of investors are classified as undetermined in one or both 
investment styles.  We find the existence of investors who trade consistently following a 
single strategy for both value and growth (both momentum and contrarian) and we find 
investors who trading inconsistently following one strategy in one style but a different 
strategy in the opposing style.  This is evidence supporting both the personality theory and 
the situation-dependent theory.  We adopt the convenient notation ―Strategy G / Strategy 
V‖ where Strategy G refers to the strategy used when trading growth and Strategy V refers 
to the strategy used when trading value. 
Results are listed in Table VI.  Panel A describes the classification of purchases and 
Panel B describes the classification of redemptions.  With respect to purchases (Panel A), 
we can judge the consistency of investors trading by comparing investors labeled as 
Momentum/Momentum or Contrarian/Contrarian to the investors who are labeled as 
Contrarian/Momentum and Momentum/Contrarian.  By observation, we notice that 
consistency is challenged by the existence of Contrarian/Momentum and 
Momentum/Contrarian investors.  For all return signals, the majority of investors are 
classified as Contrarian/Contrarian and Momentum/Contrarian.  More investors are 
classified as Contrarian/Contrarian for the shorter-term signals while slightly more 
investors are classified as Momentum/Contrarian for the longer-term signals. Less than 5% 
of the investors (across all signals) can be classified as Momentum/Momentum and an 
even smaller percentage of investors (1% or less) follow the Contrarian/Momentum 
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strategy.  This result shows the strong connection between the value investing and the 
contrarian trading strategy.  
The overall pattern is surprising.  This table shows that a large fraction of investors 
trade differently across asset classes – momentum in growth but contrarian in value.  These 
investors trade like the growth only investors in their growth trades but trade like the value 
only investors with their value trades.  This supports the situation-dependent theory – 
particularly mental accounting. 
We determine the degree of consistency of trading across asset classes using two 
tests.  We first calculate Cohen‘s kappa coefficient to describe the level of consistency.21  
The kappa coefficient is a statistical measure of consistency (or agreement) and describes 
the difference in the amount of agreement beyond that expected by chance. If there is 
complete agreement (all investors are Mom/Mom or Contr/Contr), then kappa will equal 
one. Values of zero or less than zero indicate no agreement. As a rule of thumb, values of 
kappa above 0.4 are generally considered moderate agreement and values above 0.8 as 
excellent (almost perfect) agreement.
22
  The provided test determines if kappa is equal to 
zero – no consistency in trading strategies across asset classes. 
The second statistic used is the log odds ratio test.
23
  This ratio compares the 
number of individuals that trade consistently to those who trade inconsistently.  The value 
                                               
21 Kappa is defined as    eeo  1/ , where  iio  is the observed agreement and 
  iie  is the expected agreement.  The value ij is the probability of an individual being 
classified in the i, j-th category.   
22 Cohen (1960) and Fleiss (1981). 
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ranges from minus infinity to infinity with negative values indicating no agreement and 
infinity indicating complete agreement.  As with the kappa coefficient, we test if the log 
odds ratio is equal to zero indicating no consistency in trading strategies across asset 
classes. 
 For buying behavior, we can conclude that there is little agreement between the 
strategies each individual uses with their growth trades and the strategies the same investor 
uses with their value trades. Using both statistics we reject the hypothesis that there is no 
agreement in trading strategies across asset classes for nearly all cases.  The hypothesis of 
no agreement is not rejected for the longer term signals primarily using the log odds ratio.  
Statistically speaking, there exists some consistency in trading with the short-term signals 
but there is no consistency with the long-term signals.  Even when we do find some 
consistency in trading strategies across asset classes, the degree of consistency is small.  
Both kappa and the log odds ratio are small supporting the existence of a large proportion 
of investors who react to past returns differently in their buys into value than their buys 
into growth.  
 Similar differences in behavior can be seen in the selling patterns (Table VI Panel 
B).  The log odds ratio and the kappa coefficient provide slightly different results.  We 
reject the hypothosis of no agreement in nearly all cases using kappa, but fail to reject 
using the log odds ratio.  However, we mostly observe kappas below 0.2 suggesting that 
though significant, the level of agreement is small.  
Table VI Panel B shows that the most likely strategy combination is 
Momentum/Momentum for most return signals.  The second most likely combination of 
strategies is the Contrarian/Momentum.  Next in line is the Momentum/Contrarian 
combination – particularly with the short-term signals.  Hence, we find a strong presence 
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of investors using different strategies for the different styles – 6.5% using the 1-day signal 
and 12% using the 10-day signal. 
 As a final test, we show that there are significantly more growth trades of multi-
style investors classified as momentum than there are value trades classified as momentum, 
and there are significantly more value trades classified as contrarian than there are growth 
trades classified as contrarian.   To test this, we use McNemar‘s Test.24 The test is applied 
to a 2x2 contingency table, where the columns are Growth Momentum and Growth 
Contrarian, and the rows are Value Momentum and Value Contrarian. The cells contain the 
number of investors in each category. Statistical significance means that the inconsistent 
(off-diagonal) investors are not equal indicating the unequal use of a strategy with a 
particular style.   
As seen in Table VI, Panel A, we reject the equality for all cases.  We find 
significantly more contrarian value buyers than contrarian growth buyers, and we find 
significantly more momentum growth buyers than momentum value buyers. Multi-style 
investors who trade differently in their growth and value funds tend to be contrarian value 
and momentum growth buyers. These are the same tendencies as we find for growth-only 
and value-only investors. This statistical test confirms the patterns reported in Figure 3. 
Our findings for selling behavior (Table VI, Panel B) are the same. We strongly 
reject equality in all but two cases.  There are significantly more contrarian growth-
                                               
24 McNemar‘s test determines if we classify the same number of momentum growth investors as we find 
momentum value investors and if we classify the same number of contrarian growth investors as we classify 
contrarian value investors.  Hence, we are comparing  
Mom|Mom + Mom|Contra = Mom|Mom +Contra|Mom 
Contra|Contra+Contra|Mom = Contra|Contra+Mom|Contra 
The test above is the same as comparing the size of the off-diagonal cells (due to canceling like terms). 
McNemar statistic is computed as:  Q = (Mom|Contra – Contra|Mom)2 / (Mom|Contra+Contra|Mom)  where 
Q follows a chi-squared distribution. Statistical rejection implies that there is a significantly larger group of 
buyers who are Mom|Contr compared to Contr|Mom, and there is a significantly larger group of sellers who 
are Contr|Mom compared to Mom|Contr. 
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momentum value sellers than momentum growth-contrarian value sellers.  This result 
again reinforces the finding that investors who trade growth tend to follow a momentum 
buying and contrarian selling strategy while investors who trade value tend to follow a 
contrarian buying and momentum selling strategy. Here, too, multi-style investors who 
trade differently in their growth and value funds tend to behave similarly to growth-only 
investors in their growth trades, and similarly to value-only investors in their value trades. 
This statistical test confirms the patterns reported in Figure 4. 
A significant number of investors do not follow the same trading rules between 
asset classes. For multi-style investors who fall in this category, we find that they tend to 
trade their growth funds similarly to growth-only investors, and they tend to trade their 
value funds in a fashion similar to value-only investors.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
Investors use patterns in prices to determine when to buy and sell financial 
securities.  It has been previously shown that some investors follow a contrarian strategy 
while other investors follow a momentum strategy. However, it is important to understand 
to what extent trading styles are inherent vs. contextual.  
In this paper we study the investing strategies of three distinct groups of investors: 
those who specialize in growth securities, those who specialize in value securities, and 
those who trade both growth and value securities.  We find significant differences in how 
these three groups trade.  Value investors tend to buy after prices fall, and sell as prices 
decline. Growth investors tend to buy after price increases and sell after observing positive 
returns. Thus, value investors tend to be contrarian buyers, while growth investors tend to 
be momentum buyers. Further, we show that growth investors tend to rely on short-term 
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signals while value investors follow longer-term signals. Value and growth investors 
exhibit significant differences in how they approach the buying and selling of securities. 
They exhibit differences not only in how they respond to a return signal (momentum or 
contrarian), but also in the type of signal to which they respond. 
After establishing trading patterns of growth investors and value investors, we 
study investors who trade in both value and growth. To investigate inherent vs. contextual 
behavior, we propose a mechanism based on priming of identity. The proposed mechanism 
relies on the potential for one or the other investment style to be made salient in an investor 
who holds both types of funds. A single investor can maintain a latent identification with 
multiple styles, and priming can make one of multiple identities salient for decision-
making. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the trading style of an 
individual is not independent of context, but instead may be influenced by the 
characteristics of the investment. The multi-style investors in our sample exhibit different 
trading behavior depending on the style of the traded security.  The multi-style investors 
trade growth like the growth only investors, and they trade value like the value only 
investors.   
This paper adds to the literature describing how investors trade.  In the prior 
literature on investor trading behavior, it has been subtly assumed that investors are 
initially endowed with a particular trading behavior and therefore the consistent behavior 
can be modeled relatively easily using a utility function.  Our results indicate that the 
choice of trading strategy may depend in a significant way on the characteristics of the 
security being traded.  The same individual chooses a momentum strategy when trading 
growth assets but chooses a contrarian strategy when trading value assets.  
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Collectively, our results call to attention the importance of asset characteristics and 
investment environment as determinants of trading behavior. Current theories do not 
explain our results. For example, portfolio rebalancing does not explain why the same 
multi-style investor trades in ways similar to both the value-style investor and the growth-
style investor – contrarian in value and momentum in growth. Such a theory would need to 
explain (1) the simultaneous existence of growth investors, value investors, and multi-style 
investors and (2) why value assets are associated with a contrarian strategy using longer-
term signals while growth securities are associated with a momentum strategy relying on 
shorter-term signals. The mechanism of priming of identity, however, has a potential to 
explain this. Investors have identified the popular asset styles of value and growth as being 
different and thus worthy of differential treatment.   
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Investors are placed into three groups: growth investors who trade only growth, value investors who trade only value, multi-style 
investors (growth and value investors) who trade both growth and value.  No. of Accounts is the number of different investors who 
make at least one buy or sell trade.  No. of Transactions is the total number of buy and sell trades of all investors. This value is then 
subdivided into number of purchases and number of sales.  Transactions per account is the average number of trades made by each 
investor account.  Trade size per account and Dollar Trade are measures of trade size. The former is the average number of shares 
traded by each investor, and the latter is the average dollar value of the trade by each investor. 
  Growth Investors Value Investors Multi-Style Investors 
  Growth Trades Value Trades Growth Trades Value Trades 
No. of Accounts  76,775 6,705 3,978 3,978 
No. of Transactions Total 340,809 20,598 39,123 12,400 
 Purchases  251,414 13,101 29,154 6,007 
 Sales 89,395 7,497 9,969 6,393 
Transactions per account Mean 4.44 3.07 9.83 3.11 
 Median 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
 St. Dev 11.98 9.20 86.06 9.63 
Trade Size per account Mean 720.97 610.60 697.41 522.83 
(in shares) Median 209.68 216.03 150.93 142.76 
 St. Dev 3968.92 3347.22 4422.04 2918.98 
Dollar Trade per account Mean 10,390.33 13,063.75 10,126.22 9943.71 
($) Median 3102.25 4780.00 2445.67 2668.02 
 St. Dev 54,044.14 72,227.95 55,832.01 52,407.45 
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Table II 
Trading Classification for Purchases 
 
We classify value investors and growth investors as being momentum buyers, contrarian buyers and undefined for various past return 
signals.  To be included, investors must trade only Value (Panel A) or only Growth (Panel B) and the must have traded at least four 
times.  The values in the table are the percent of investors who fit the classification.  Panel C gives the average investor type for each 
signal.  We give a value of +1 to momentum traders, -1 to contrarian traders and 0 to undefined investors.  The average, therefore, 
describes whether the style investors lean to one type of trading strategy – positive value indicates that the average investor is momentum 
and negative value indicates that the average investor is contrarian.  The Mantel-Haenszel chi-square statistic tests if the average value 
investor is equal to the average growth investor. 
Panel A: Value Trader Purchases 
 Signal 1-day 5-day 10-day 20-day 40-day 60-day 90-day 
Strong Momentum α<0.1 1.94 1.79 0.60 0.60 1.34 2.24 3.43 
Weak Momentum 0.5>α>0.1 14.03 12.84 10.00 8.36 8.51 6.57 6.72 
Undefined  51.94 57.76 48.06 69.10 61.49 50.00 43.88 
Weak Contrarian 0.5>α>0.1 26.42 20.45 28.66 15.82 17.31 19.40 9.85 
Strong Contrarian α<0.1 5.67 7.16 12.69 6.12 11.34 21.79 36.12 
Panel B: Growth Trader Purchases 
 Signal 1-day 5-day 10-day 20-day 40-day 60-day 90-day 
Strong Momentum α<0.1 5.35 4.35 3.57 4.83 7.05 9.80 16.01 
Weak Momentum 0.5>α>0.1 15.90 15.69 17.71 20.42 20.91 26.68 38.42 
Undefined Undefined 58.45 60.10 64.91 64.10 64.66 59.49 43.06 
Weak Contrarian 0.5>α>0.1 15.71 14.52 11.07 8.43 4.44 3.02 1.95 
Strong Contrarian α<0.1 4.59 5.34 2.74 2.22 2.95 1.02 0.56 
Panel C: Comparison of Growth and Value Investors 
Value Investor Average -0.161 -0.130 -0.307 -0.130 -0.188 -0.324 -0.358 
Growth Investor Average 0.010 0.002 0.075 0.146 0.206 0.324 0.519 
         
Mantel- Haenszel Chi-Sq 44.10 27.48 250.27 140.16 275.36 636.70 968.93 
 p-value (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
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Table III 
Trading Classification for Sells 
 
We classify value investors and growth investors as being momentum sellers, contrarian sellers and undefined for various past return 
signals.  To be included, investors must trade only Value (Panel A) or only Growth (Panel B) and the must have traded at least four 
times.  The values in the table are the percent of investors who fit the classification.  Panel C gives the average investor type for each 
signal.  We give a value of +1 to momentum traders, -1 to contrarian traders and 0 to undefined investors.  The average, therefore, 
describes whether the style investors lean to one type of trading strategy – positive value indicates that the average investor is momentum 
and negative value indicates that the average investor is contrarian.  The Mantel-Haenszel chi-square statistic tests if the average value 
investor is equal to the average growth investor. 
Panel A: Value Trader Sells 
 Signal 1-day 5-day 10-day 20-day 40-day 60-day 90-day 
Strong Contrarian α<0.1 2.56 1.50 1.07 2.56 0.85 1.28 0.85 
Weak Contrarian 0.5>α>0.1 13.46 12.39 9.62 10.68 17.74 10.90 4.49 
Undefined Undefined 51.07 54.06 48.72 60.26 59.62 56.62 40.38 
Weak Momentum 0.5>α>0.1 25.21 24.57 29.70 21.15 15.38 19.02 19.66 
Strong Momentum α<0.1 7.69 7.48 10.90 5.34 6.41 12.18 34.62 
Panel B: Growth Trader Sells 
 Signal 1-day 5-day 10-day 20-day 40-day 60-day 90-day 
Strong Contrarian α<0.1 3.25 3.23 2.00 3.78 4.93 5.47 8.41 
Weak Contrarian 0.5>α>0.1 15.77 17.75 18.33 23.11 16.13 21.42 28.56 
Undefined Undefined 55.88 55.18 58.07 57.85 67.04 65.20 59.15 
Weak Momentum 0.5>α>0.1 23.29 21.72 20.00 14.21 9.85 6.62 3.46 
Strong Momentum α<0.1 1.82 2.11 1.60 1.05 2.05 1.29 0.42 
Panel C: Comparison of Growth and Value Investors 
Value Investor Average 0.169 0.182 0.299 0.132 0.032 0.190 0.489 
Growth Investor Average 0.061 0.028 0.013 -0.116 -0.091 -0.190 -0.331 
         
Mantel- Haenszel Chi-Sq 11.98 23.06 85.97 65.75 18.91 173.22 669.20 
Value p-value (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
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Table IV 
Investor Classification by Signal Horizon 
 
We classify all investors as strong contrarian, weak contrarian, undefined, weak momentum, and strong momentum using the methods 
described in Tables II and III according to their buying history.  We then classify each investor according to the return signal that best 
describes their trading - the return signal that minimized the p-value of the binomial distribution.  Values in the table are percentages of 
the total population. 
Panel A: Value Trader Buys 
 Row Sum 1-day 5-day 10-day 20-day 40-day 60-day 90-day 
Str. Contr. 44.84 2.64 3.00 5.28 2.04 0.84 6.12 24.94 
Wk. Contr. 19.42 2.88 1.44 3.96 2.88 1.32 1.68 5.28 
Undefined 21.46        
Wk. Mom. 9.23 3.12 2.52 0.84 0.96 0.72 0.36 0.72 
Str. Mom. 5.04 0.24 1.08 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.72 2.40 
Column Sum 100.00 8.87 8.03 10.19 6.12 3.12 8.87 33.33 
 
Panel B: Growth Trader Buys 
 Row Sum 1-day 5-day 10-day 20-day 40-day 60-day 90-day 
Str. Contr. 12.43 3.02 3.60 1.40 1.40 1.85 0.75 0.41 
Wk. Contr. 22.90 6.84 3.90 3.17 3.58 2.27 1.91 1.23 
Undefined 9.52        
Wk. Mom. 31.61 5.84 5.21 5.22 3.86 3.20 3.80 4.49 
Str. Mom. 23.54 3.58 1.97 1.23 1.72 1.51 2.93 10.60 
Column Sum 100.00 19.27 14.68 11.02 10.56 8.82 9.39 16.73 
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Table V 
Investor Classification by Signal Horizon 
 
We classify all investors as strong contrarian, weak contrarian, undefined, weak momentum, and strong momentum using the methods 
described in Tables II and III according to their selling history.  We then classify each investor according to the return signal that best 
describes their trading - the return signal that minimized the p-value of the binomial distribution.  Values in the table are percentages of 
the total population. 
Panel A: Value Trader Sells 
 Row Sum 1-day 5-day 10-day 20-day 40-day 60-day 90-day 
Str. Contr. 3.00 0.96 0.48 0.24 0.60 0.24 0.24 0.24 
Wk. Contr. 6.12 0.96 1.32 0.72 0.96 1.20 0.72 0.24 
Undefined 44.96        
Wk. Mom. 18.71 1.32 1.08 3.00 1.56 0.36 1.44 9.95 
Str. Mom. 27.22 2.64 1.56 2.28 1.08 0.72 1.56 17.39 
Column Sum 100.00 5.88 4.44 6.24 4.20 2.52 3.96 27.82 
 
Panel B: Growth Trader Sells 
 Row Sum 1-day 5-day 10-day 20-day 40-day 60-day 90-day 
Str. Contr. 8.11 1.43 0.78 0.41 0.72 0.67 0.89 3.21 
Wk. Contr. 16.23 4.94 3.45 2.23 1.88 1.47 1.33 0.92 
Undefined 50.01        
Wk. Mom. 21.66 4.57 2.70 3.97 3.07 2.91 2.43 2.00 
Str. Mom. 3.99 0.65 0.76 0.64 0.43 0.78 0.54 0.19 
Column Sum 100.00 11.59 7.70 7.25 6.10 5.84 5.19 6.33 
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Table VI 
Trading Classification of Multi-Style Investors 
 
This table shows the trading strategies of investors who trade both value and growth given in terms of percentages of total number of investors.  The columns 
identify the past return signal used.  The rows identify the strategy used by investors – Momentum/Contrarian identifies those investors who follow a momentum 
growth strategy but a contrarian value strategy.  Undetermined includes those investors not classified as contrarian and/or momentum.  We test for agreement in 
trading strategy by computing the Kappa coefficient.  The p-value provided is the exact probability that the Kappa coefficient is zero – representing no 
agreement.  The closer Kappa is to unity, the greater the agreement (values above 0.4 indicate moderate agreement). We also use the log odds ratio test. This 
ratio compares the number of individuals that trade consistently across the two styles to those who trade inconsistently. The value ranges from zero (no 
agreement) to infinity (complete agreement). We use McNemar test to test whether we classify the same number of value investors as momentum as we do with 
growth, and the same number of value contrarians as we do growth contrarians. The test is applied to a 2x2 contingency table, where the columns are Growth 
Momentum and Growth Contrarian, and the rows are Value Momentum and Value Contrarian. The cells contain the number of investors in each category. The 
test effectively compares size of the off-diagonal cells. Test statistic is computed as:  Q = (Mom|Contra – Contra|Mom)^2 / (Mom|Contra+Contra|Mom)  and it 
follows a chi-squared distribution. Statistical rejection implies that there is a significantly larger group of buyers who are Mom|Contr compared to Contr|Mom, 
and there is a significantly larger group of sellers who are Contr|Mom compared to Mom|Contr.   
Panel A:  Buys 
Growth / Value 1-day 5-day 10-day 20-day 40-day 60-day 90-day 
Momentum / Momentum 1.23 3.13 3.27 4.15 0.82 1.23 2.25 
Contrarian  / Momentum 0.54 1.09 0.61 0.48 0.14 0.34 0.07 
Momentum / Contrarian 8.78 6.54 5.04 4.63 2.31 2.93 6.47 
Contrarian  / Contrarian 15.52 10.69 9.87 5.38 3.68 2.65 0.61 
Undetermined 73.93 78.56 81.21 85.36 93.06 92.85 90.61 
        
Log Odds Ratio 0.60 0.67 1.02 1.01 0.98 0.51 0.50 
p-value (0.086) (0.017) (0.005) (0.010) (0.109) (0.176) (0.322) 
        
Kappa 0.105 0.134 0.355 0.350 0.240 0.162 0.030 
p-value (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.022) (0.242) 
        
McNemar 106.87 57.14 50.90 49.61 28.44 30.08 92.04 
p-value (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
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Panel B: Sells 
Growth / Value 1-day 5-day 10-day 20-day 40-day 60-day 90-day 
Momentum / Momentum 13.97 9.48 11.88 7.88 5.79 1.90 1.10 
Contrarian  / Momentum 3.49 3.79 8.88 3.49 1.00 1.70 3.69 
Momentum / Contrarian 2.99 2.40 3.19 2.40 0.10 0.10 0.00 
Contrarian  / Contrarian 1.30 1.70 1.00 2.20 1.00 1.50 1.60 
Undetermined 78.24 82.63 75.05 84.03 92.12 94.81 93.61 
        
Log Odds Ratio 0.24 0.25 -0.38 0.32 1.76 1.22 0.73 
p-value (0.266) (0.252) (0.835) (0.189) (0.055) (0.130) (0.250) 
        
Kappa 0.098 0.115 -0.123 0.160 0.567 0.364 0.111 
p-value (0.108) (0.088) (0.015) (0.032) (0.000) (0.001) (0.081) 
        
McNemar 0.38 3.16 26.85 2.05 7.36 14.22 35.10 
p-value 
(0.540) (0.083) (0.0001) (0.156) (0.013) (0.001) (0.0001) 
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Figure 1: Average Investor Type – Purchases 
Value investors (solid line) and growth investors (line with ×) are classified as contrarian 
or momentum traders according to the purchasing behavior.  Contrarian investors are 
given a value of -1 and momentum investors are given a value of +1.  The figure plots the 
average investor type for growth and value style investors for ten different return signals. 
Positive value indicates that the average investor is momentum and negative value 
indicates that the average investor is contrarian.    
Figure 2: Average Investor Type – Sells 
Value investors (solid line) and growth investors (line with ×) are classified as contrarian 
or momentum traders according to their selling behavior.  Contrarian investors are given 
a value of -1 and momentum investors are given a value of +1.  The figure plots the 
average investor type for growth and value style investors for ten different return signals. 
Positive value indicates that the average investor is momentum and negative 
value indicates that the average investor is contrarian. 
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Figure 3. Investor Types and Return Signal – Buys.  
The chart in each panel shows the distribution of different investors for various past return signals. We classify 
value investors, growth investors, multi-style investors who trade in value and in growth funds as being 
momentum buyers, contrarian buyers and undefined. The categories on the X-axis correspond to the different 
length of the prior return signal, from the return over the previous one day (1-day), five trading days (5-day)—a 
week, through the return over the previous 90 trading days (90-day). The Y-axis is the proportion of investors 
classified into one of the five categories (from bottom to the top): Momentum Strong (MS), Momentum Weak 
(MW), Unclassified (U), Contrarian Weak (CW), and Contrarian Strong (CS). 
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Figure 4. Investor Types and Return Signal – Sells.  
The chart in each panel shows the distribution of different investors for various past return signals. We classify 
value investors, growth investors, multi-style investors who trade in value and in growth funds as being 
momentum sellers, contrarian sellers and undefined. The categories on the X-axis correspond to the different 
length of the prior return signal, from the return over the previous one day (1-day), five trading days (5-day)—a 
week, through the return over the previous 90 trading days (90-day). The Y-axis is the proportion of investors 
classified into one of the five categories (from bottom to the top): Momentum Strong (MS), Momentum Weak 
(MW), Unclassified (U), Contrarian Weak (CW), and Contrarian Strong (CS). 
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